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Abstract
The dangers of shouting “fire” in a crowded theater are well understood, but
the dangers of rushing to the exit in the financial markets are more complex.
Yet, the two events share several features, and I analyze why people crowd into
theaters and trades, why they run, what determines the risk, whether to return
to the theater or trade when the dust settles, and how much to pay for assets (or
tickets) in light of this risk. These theoretical considerations shed light on the
recent global liquidity crisis and, in particular, the quant event of 2007.
1 Introduction
People choose to crowd into a theater or a trade because they share a common goal:
in one case, they all want to see the best play in town, in the other, they all pursue the
highest risk-adjusted return. They run for the exit because staying is associated with
real risk, namely being caught in the theater fire or being forced to liquidate at the
most distressed prices. Many people running introduces a second, and endogenous, risk:
Theater guests risk being trampled by running feet, and traders risk being trampled
by falling prices, margin calls, and vanishing capital — a negative externality that
increases the aggregate risk.
The risk of running for the exit depends on how crowded the theater or trade is,
and the quality of risk management. The liquidity risk can be reduced by restricting
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reliance on funding that cannot be depended on during crises, by limiting how large
and levered positions one takes, or, even better, if the leveraged players limit how large
an aggregate position they take relative to their capital.
Finally, investors return to these markets as liquidity crises create opportunities.
Indeed, the expected return on liquidity provision rises during crisis. Just like fear of
a theater fire would reduce ticket prices, liquidity risk reduces asset prices.
A panic run to the exit is so dangerous that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s
opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Schenck v. U.S. (1919) states: “The
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting
fire in a theater and causing a panic.” Panic runs have been studied extensively by
physicists,1 who document and model how people try to move faster and start pushing,
passing of bottlenecks becomes uncoordinated, exits are clogged, alternative exits are
used inefficiently, and the risk depends on the design of the exit routes. As evidence of
the danger of such runs, jammed crowds can cause pressures up to 4500 Newtons per
meter, which can bend steel barriers or tear down brick walls, and escape is further
slowed by fallen or injured people turning into “obstacles.”
A panic run in the financial markets is also serious, and, indeed, the global crisis that
started in 2007 provides ample evidence of the importance of liquidity risk. Subprime
credit losses put highly levered financial institutions into a tailspin, their sources of
funding dried up, and each institution’s liquidations and risk reductions added stress to
the other institutions as the crisis spilled over to other credit markets, money markets,
currency markets, convertible bonds, stocks, and over-the-counter derivatives. Cen-
tral banks’ balance sheets increased significantly as they tried to address the funding
problems using various lending programs and unconventional monetary policy tools.
I focus on the “quant” event of August 2007 as it illustrates well the nature of
liquidity crises. While this event was almost invisible to the public, it can be seen
very clearly through the lens of a diversified long-short strategy. Quantitative traders
running for the exit had a significant impact on some of the most liquid markets in
the world, and I show how prices dropped and rebounded in early August 2007. Using
high-frequency data, I document an amazing short-term predictability and volatility
driven by the run to the exit (Figure 1, Panel (a)). In hindsight, the quant crisis was
an early warning signal of how the levered system would face trouble as the liquidity
spirals caused havoc in the global markets.
The recent liquidity crisis is the last in a string of earlier ones throughout history,
such as the crash of 1987, the crisis following the Russian default in 1998, the convertible
bond episode in 2005, and currency crashes when carry trades unwind. To reduce the
risk of the next one, it is important to understand the mechanisms that drive these
crises. Therefore, after presenting the evidence from the global liquidity crisis and the
1See Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek (2000), Helbing (2001), Helbing, Buzna, Johansson, and Werner
(2005), and references therein.
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Panel (a): Minute-by-Minute Data from the Quant Event 2007.
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Figure 1: Everyone Runs for the Exit. Panel (a) shows the cumulative return to
a long-short market-neutral value and momentum strategy for U.S. large cap stocks,
scaled to 6% annualized volatility during August 3-14, 2007. Panel (b) illustrates the
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) model’s predicted price path when everyone runs
for the exit.
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quant event in Section 2, I consider some models of liquidity risk in Section 3.2
I analyze the underlying causes of forced selling, the reasons why other investors
may sell even if they are not forced to do so, and the resulting price path (Figure 1,
Panel (b)). I show how “liquidity spirals” amplify and spread the initial shock when
selling leads to more selling, higher margin requirements, tighter risk management, and
withdrawal of capital, consistent with the evidence from the crisis that I present.
Finally, I discuss the implications for asset pricing and monetary policy. I explain
how securities with larger and more varying transaction costs must offer higher expected
returns as compensation for the larger market-liquidity risk. Further, securities with
higher margin requirements must offer higher expected returns as compensation for
their larger use of capital and funding-liquidity risk. For instance, securities backed by
loans and other credit instruments have higher yields (or lower prices) if their market
liquidity risk and margin requirements are higher. Hence, monetary policy that affects
margin requirements (or “haircuts”), funding, and market liquidity can thus affect
asset prices and credit availability.
2 Running for the Exit in the Real World
I first study the recent global financial crisis and how it spilled over across asset classes
with a special focus on the quant event of August 2007.
2.1 The Global Liquidity Crisis that Started in 2007
In the years preceding the crisis, the global financial markets were flush with liquidity
due to low interest rates, high savings rates in Asia, economic growth, and low volatility.
As a response to low borrowing costs and low apparent risk, financial institutions
became highly levered (a positive liquidity spiral). This made them vulnerable. When
house prices started to decline and it started to become clear in 2007 that subprime
borrowers would default in large numbers, an adverse liquidity spiral was kicked off.
Many banks experienced significant mark-to-market losses, and two hedge funds at
Bear Stearns blew up due to subprime-related collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
in June 2007.
Market liquidity dried up in one market after another as volatility picked up, fund-
ing became tight, and risk premia rose as seen in Figure 2. The figure shows the
evolution of market liquidity as measured by bid-ask spread, in percent of mid quote,
averaged across large cap U.S. stocks.3 The figures also shows the TED spread and the
2My understanding of the crisis is largely based on my own research, and this is reflected in this
note. Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006) review the broad literature on liquidity and asset
pricing, and Gorton (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), and Krishnamurthy (2009) review the crisis and
amplification mechanisms.
3This is computed using tick data, using the best bid and ask quotes at 3PM each day.
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VIX index. The TED spread is the difference between the interest rate on 3 months
uncollateralized interbank LIBOR loans and the interest rates on Treasury Bills. A
high TED spread indicates reluctance to provide interbank loans, that is, risks and
funding problems in the financial sector. VIX is the volatility of the S&P500 equity
index as implied by the option markets, and may also be related to funding liquidity as
many financial institutions are exposed to the VIX directly or indirectly. We see that
there is a close co-movement between bid-ask spreads and VIX throughout the crisis,
and also a visible connection to the TED spreads, indicating a link between market
liquidity, funding liquidity, and volatility as explained by the theory in Section 3.4
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Figure 2: Bid-Ask Spreads During the Global Liquidity Crisis. The chart
shows average bid-ask spread for large cap U.S. stocks, the equity volatility index VIX,
and the interest-rate spread between LIBOR and Treasury bills (TED) from July 2006
to July 2009. Each of the series has been scaled to have a zero mean and a unit
standard deviation.
4See Nagel (2009) for further evidence.
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2.2 Spirals and Spillover
The shock to the subprime credit market spread quickly spilled over to other markets
as seen in Figure 3. It spread to credit markets more broadly, to money markets, to
quant equity in the U.S., and later to quant equity in Japan and beyond. Next, the
liquidity shock started to affect the currency carry trade, commercial mortgage backed
securities, convertible bonds, event arbitrage, and fixed-income markets. Investors ran
for the exit in one market after another, and the rush to the exits reached its peak after
Lehman failed in September 2008. Market liquidity deteriorated in most markets and
vanished almost completely in many over-the-counter markets. For instance, dealers in
emerging-market interest-rate swaps largely stopped quoting bid and ask prices. The
extreme market liquidity risk was complemented by extreme funding liquidity risk as
haircuts and margin requirements went up and certain securities became unacceptable
as collateral for many counterparties. As the funding situation for banks and other
financial institutions deteriorated, central banks globally had to expand their balance
sheets substantially to deal with the ramifications.
In many different markets, it turned out that levered liquidity-providing traders had
some common features in their portfolios. Despite their different investment philoso-
phies and analysis, one manager’s long positions was another manager’s long more
often than it was a short. Is this herding in the sense that traders are buying some-
thing because they have heard that others are buying it? It need not be. Consider
the theoretical benchmark of each trader doing his independent analysis on common
data: in a standard Markowitz/CAPM world, all investors are holding exactly the
same portfolio, namely the “tangency” portfolio with the highest risk-adjusted return.
While real-world traders are far more diverse than this theoretical benchmark since
they use different methods to estimate risk and expected return, it is natural to expect
that at least the most sophisticated traders in a specific market have some overlap in
their portfolios since they are striving towards the same goal.
2.3 What is Quant?
Before showing more detailed evidence from the quant event, it is useful to briefly ex-
plain what quant is. Most traders, e.g. proprietary traders and hedge funds, engage in
“discretionary trading,” meaning that the decision to buy or sell is at the trader’s dis-
cretion given his overall assessment based on experience, various kinds of information,
intuition, etc.
This traditional form of trading can be seen in contrast to “quantitative trading,” or
“quant” for short.5 Quants define the trading rules explicitly and build systems that
5Quantitative traders are close cousins to, but perform different roles than, the “sell-side quants”
described in Emanuel Derman’s interesting autobiography “My Life as a Quant”. Sell side quants
provide analytical tools that are helpful for hedging, risk management, discretionary traders, clients,
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Figure 3: Spillover in the Beginning of the Crisis (July-August, 2007). The
figure shows how the crisis started with a decline in the price of the subprime credit.
In July 2007, quantitative long-short stock-selection strategies based on value and mo-
mentum in the United States (Quant US) began to experience losses, and subsequently
this spilled over to similar strategies in Japan (Quant JP). The currency carry trade ex-
perienced an unwinding in the end of August. The price series and cumulative returns
have been normalized to be 100 in the beginning of July.
implement them systematically. They try to develop a small edge on each of many
small diversified trades using sophisticated processing of ideas that cannot be easily
processed using non-quantitative methods. To do this, they use tools and insights from
economics, finance, statistics, math, computer science, and engineering, combined with
lots of data (public and proprietary) to identify relationships that market participants
may not have incorporated in the price immediately. They build computer systems that
generate trading signals based on these relationships, perform portfolio optimization
in light of trading costs, and trade using automated execution schemes that route
hundreds of orders every few seconds. In other words, trading is done by feeding data
and other purposes.
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into computers that run various programs with human oversight.
Some quants focus on high-frequency trading where they exit a trade minutes or
days after it was entered. Others focus on lower frequency trades, and still others do
some of both. For instance, “value” strategies seek to buy cheap securities (and short
over-valued ones), and, since such securities often stay cheap for months, this is a low
frequency (that is, low turnover) strategy. “Momentum” strategies buy securities that
recently performed relatively well, while shorting under-performing securities, based
on the idea that such recent performance has tended to continue more often than it
has reversed. (Value and momentum in many asset classes is discussed in Asness,
Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2008)). Another strategy is to provide liquidity to securities
with temporary order imbalances that are associated with short-term price reversals,
and this is inherently a high-frequency strategy.
While discretionary trading has the advantages of a tailored analysis of each trade
and the use of soft information such as private conversations, its labor-intensive method
implies that only a limited number of securities can be analyzed in depth, and the
discretion exposes the trader to psychological biases. Quantitative trading has the
advantage of discipline, an ability to apply a trading idea to a wide universe of securities
with the benefits of diversification, efficient portfolio construction, and an ability to
“back test” the strategy, meaning that one can check how well one would have done
by following such a strategy in the past. Of course, past success does not guarantee
future success, but at least it rules out using rules that never worked and, to a degree,
psychological biases. The quant method’s disadvantage is its reliance on hard data and
the computer program’s limited ability to incorporate real-time human judgment.
2.4 The Quant Event of August 2007
Quants trade in many markets and, in particular, take significant long and short posi-
tions in stocks. By mid-2007, quant-managed stock portfolios had about 300-400 billion
dollar long and short positions in equities by some estimates. In August, a significant
liquidity event occurred in which some quants were forced to unwind and others also
reduced positions. The buying and selling pressure was immense. It consisted of hun-
dreds of billions of dollars as aggregate positions were reduced approximately by half
according to some prime broker estimates. While the effects were clear to quants, they
were at first largely hidden to outsiders since the trades were spread over thousands
of stocks, with some stock prices being pushed up and others pushed down. To “see”
the event, one must look through the lens of a typical quant’s diversified long/short
portfolio at a high frequency.
While the precise origin of the event is hard to determine with certainty, the fol-
lowing is a likely sequence of events (see also Khandani and Lo (2007) and Khandani
and Lo (2009)). In June 2007, many banks and some hedge funds experienced sig-
nificant losses due credit exposure or to the ripple effects of the credit turmoil. In
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July, some started to reduce risk and raise cash by selling liquid instruments such as
their stock positions, hurting the returns of common stock-selection strategies. Some
banks even closed down some of their trading desks down, including quant proprietary
trading operations. Simultaneously, some hedge funds were experiencing redemptions.
For instance, some funds of funds (hedge funds investing in other hedge funds) hit
loss triggers and were forced to redeem from the hedge funds they were invested in,
including quants.
The quant value strategy in particular experienced losses in July. Money was pulled
out of stocks that were potential leveraged buy-out (LBO) candidates because of the
reduced access to leverage. These were stocks that LBO firms considered cheap based
on strong value and cash flow characteristics, and, since quants typically consider sim-
ilar characteristics, this hurt value strategies. Value strategies were also hurt because
the cheap stocks on the long side had more leverage and therefore more sensitivity to
widening credit spreads.
On Monday August 6, 2007 a major de-levering of quant strategies began. Figure 1,
Panel (a) shows the cumulative return to a industry-neutral long-short portfolio based
on value and momentum signals. We see that the portfolio incurs substantial losses
from Monday, August 6 through Thursday, August 9, as quants were unwinding, and
then recovers much of its losses on Friday and Monday as the unwinding ended and
some traders may have re-entered their positions.
The smoothness of the graph is noteworthy. It is not an artifact of drawing the graph
by connecting a few dots – the graph uses minute-by-minute data. The smoothness
is due to a remarkable short-term predictability arising from the selling pressure and
subsequent snap back. For instance, on Tuesday August 7, the strategy was down
90% of the ten-minute intervals, and it was up 75% of the ten-minute intervals on
that Friday. This predictability provides strong evidence of a liquidity event as it is
statistically significantly different from the behavior of a random walk.
Another striking feature of the graph is the sheer magnitude of the drop and re-
bound. The strategy has been scaled to have an annualized volatility of about 6%
using a well-known commercial risk model. The strategy loses about 25% in four days,
about 4 annual standard deviations and more than 30 standard deviations based on
the 4-day volatility of (4/260)1/2 ∗ 6% = 0.74%. The 30 standard deviations must
be interpreted correctly. This number does not mean that this was a thousand year
flood and can never happen again. It means that the event was a liquidity event, not
based on stock fundamentals, and that this risk model does not capture liquidity risk
and the endogenous amplification by the liquidity spirals. Stock price fluctuations are
driven primarily by economic news about fundamentals most of the time, but during a
liquidity crisis, price pressure can have a large effect. Hence, the distribution of stock
returns can be seen as a mixture of two distributions: shocks driven by fundamentals
mixed with shocks driven by liquidity effects. Since fundamentals are usually the main
driver, conventional risk models are calibrated to capture fundamental shocks and liq-
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uidity tail events are not well captured by such models. Hence, 30 standard deviations
means that the event is statistically significantly different from a fundamental shock,
and, hence, must have been driven by a liquidity event.
The quant event started with the U.S. value strategy and spilled over to global
markets, e.g. Japan as seen in Figure 3, and to certain other types of quant factors,
though not all. For instance, even though momentum is normally negatively corre-
lated to value, these strategies became positively correlated as they both experienced
significant losses during the unwind. Also, certain high-frequency strategies that rely
on price reversals were affected due to the unusual amount of price continuation.
It is curious to notice the resemblance between the actual data from 2007 in
Panel (a), and the price path in Panel (b) predicted by the Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2005) model that we discuss next: Both graphs go down smoothly, go back up
smoothly, and, finally, level off below where they started.
3 Theoretical Background
To understand the mechanisms that drive liquidity crises, I first consider a stylized
model of running for the exit. I then show how endogenous systemic liquidity risk
arises as agents run for fear of being trampled, and, lastly, discuss the asset pricing
implications.
3.1 Running for the Exit
There are two “arbitrageurs,” and we seek to model the notion that they might run
for the exit using a simplified version of the model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005). They trade with each other and with a group of “long-term traders”, who in
the aggregate give rise to a demand curve with a slope of 1. In order words, if the
arbitrageurs buy one share, the equilibrium price goes up by 1, and, if they sell one
share, the price drops by 1.6
The agents trade at times 0, 1, and 2, and the asset pays off its dividend at the
final time 3. The arbitrageurs can hold at most 10 shares due to limited capital and
margin constraints.
At time 0, the arbitrageurs each buy 8 shares since their information indicates that
the asset is undervalued at its price per share of, say, 116. For simplicity, we take the
size of this initial purchase as given, but Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) show how
it can be derived as an optimal trade-off between potential liquidation costs (discussed
below) and the benefits of buying an undervalued asset early. The arbitrageurs have
6Evidence on downward sloping demand curves in provided by Shleifer (1986), Wurgler and Zhu-
ravskaya (2002), and others.
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similar positions because they are looking for the same thing, namely securities that
offer high returns.
At time 1, one of the arbitrageurs might lose money in another trade (say, subprime
debt) which forces him to sell his entire position of 8 shares in the asset under con-
sideration, or, alternatively, neither arbitrageur suffers such a shock. In case neither
suffers a shock, both arbitrageurs buy 2 additional shares to be fully invested up to
their limit, which pushes the price to 116+2+2= 120, where it stays until the final
dividend is paid at time 3 (a dividend which the arbitrageurs expect to be above 120).
Let us consider the more interesting case where one arbitrageur is distressed and
is forced to sell. Suppose first that the other arbitrageur doesn’t trade anything at
this time (e.g., because he does not know about the other arbitrageur’s distress). In
this case, the distressed selling pushes the price down to 116-8=108 for an average
execution price of 112.
What if the other arbitrageur knew that this selling pressure was coming? Then
he would be able to predict that the price would drop and, as a result, that he would
incur a mark-to-market loss. Therefore, he would optimally also sell at time 1, and
buy back his position at time 2. The price path associated with this selling followed
by buying is illustrated in Figure 1, Panel (b). Since both traders are selling at time
1, the price drops from 116 to 116-8-8=100 with an average execution price of 108.
When the non-distressed trader is buying back his 8 shares at time 2, he pushes the
price back up to 100+8=108 with an average execution price of 104, and he then buys
2 additional shares, pushing the price to 110. Importantly, given that he sold for 108
on average and bought back at 104, his wealth is 4 dollars higher than if he had not
traded.
The drop and rebound in prices resembles that of the quant event (Panel (a)) and
other liquidity events, and it means that the distressed trader’s losses are worsened.
When he liquidates alone, he receives an average execution price of 112, but, with both
selling, the average execution price is 108 since the price drops more sharply (and he
does not enjoy the rebound that happens after he is out of the market).
If the other trader manages to sell before the distressed trader (frontrunning) then
the distressed trader would realize an even lower liquidation value. Hence, the dis-
tressed trader rushes to the exit as fast as he can. In fact, both arbitrageurs run for
the exit and this exacerbates the distressed traders’ losses.
In this simple example, the non-distressed trader sold and bought back to enhance
his overall profit in the long run. However, the real world is more complex than that. If
someone else is pushing down the price of the assets you hold, you could soon become
distressed yourself. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) consider this endogenous dis-
tress and show that there can be multiple equilibria: “panics” can occur when people
sell because they fear others will sell, leading to more failures than in equilibria where
traders stay “calm.” In a panic equilibrium, the traders thus “step on” each other
as they run for the exit. This leads to systemic risk: a fear of forced selling leads to
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selling, and selling leads to forced selling as discussed further in the next subsection.
We have seen that liquidity evaporates exactly when it is most needed in this setting,
but, with more than one non-distressed trader, will competitive forces ensure that the
price is at its efficient level? The answer is: not generally, since running for the exit
occurs even with multiple traders in this setting.
Could this be because there are only a few time periods? In other words, since the
non-distressed traders ultimately want to hold this position, why don’t they compete
in being the first to buy back the position in a way that makes the price stabilize
without overshooting? Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) address this by allowing
many trading opportunities in a continuous-time model and show that this competition
does in fact occur if the non-distressed traders have enough excess capital to absorb the
shares that the distressed traders need to sell.7 However, if the non-distressed traders
don’t have enough capital to absorb all these shares, then the price must ultimately
fall, and this price drop gives an incentive to sell early (at a high price) and buy back
later (at a low price), leading to price overshooting.
Hence, running for the exit happens only when the selling pressure is large relative
to the available capital on the sideline. Said differently, it happens when the trade is
crowded and a significant part of the crowd is near or over the edge, with few “outsiders”
ready to step in (e.g., because it takes time to build the expertise and infrastructure
to trade these assets).
In related work, Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2008) consider a model in which
traders cooperate most of the time due to repeated interaction, but episodic liquidity
crises occurs. Chu, Lehnert, and Passmore (2009, this issue) extend the framework
to multiple assets and consider cross-asset effects and possible interventions. Duffie,
Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007) consider a funding shock among a group of investors in
an over-the-counter search market and show how the speed of the drop-and-rebound
price signature depend on the market liquidity. In illiquid markets with time-consuming
search, the drop-and-rebound occurs over a longer time period and with a deeper
drop in prices. Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2007) model dealers’ liquidity provision
following a crash.
3.2 Running for Fear of Being Trampled: Endogenous Liquid-
ity Risk
It is interesting to dig a level deeper into the main drivers of forced selling and the
mechanisms that make the run spiral into a panic liquidation. As illustrated in Figure 4,
suppose an initial shock (a shout of “fire”) leads to losses of traders, e.g. subprime
losses due to a dropping house prices as in the most recent liquidity crisis. Traders
7Figure 1, Panel (b) is in fact from a continuous-time example in that paper (the numbers in the
discrete-time example above are chosen so the examples match).
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then reduce their positions, which pushes prices away from fundamentals, and liquidity
spirals make the effect dis-proportionally larger than the initial shock. This endogenous
liquidity risk has several key elements:
First, as prices move away from fundamentals, the market becomes illiquid, volatil-
ity picks up, and these effects make it riskier for others to finance the trader’s posi-
tions. Therefore, margin requirements (or haircuts) increase, and, in extreme cases,
counterparties refuse to lend against certain securities as collateral. For instance, after
Lehman’s failure in September 2008, it became difficult to borrow against certain illiq-
uid fixed-income securities. High margins and inability to finance positions naturally
worsens levered traders’ funding problems, leading to further selling, and so on as the
margin spiral swirls (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)).
The second effect is that prices start moving against the liquidity-providing traders’
positions, leading to losses, inducing further unwinding, and the losses spiral. This is
worsened if poor performance leads to further reductions in capital, for instance if a
hedge fund has redemptions, or a bank (or multi-strategy hedge fund) moves capital
away from one trading desk to use it elsewhere (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Xiong
(2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Vayanos (2004)).
Thirdly, many traders’ risk management tightens at these times since volatility
increases — especially the volatility measured over a possible liquidation period which
lengthens due to illiquidity — and one trader’s prudent risk management can be an
other trader’s vanishing market liquidity and funding. As risk management tightens,
traders sell to reduce risk and banks cut back the funding they provide, leading to
further funding problems, and a risk management spiral arises (Garleanu and Pedersen
(2007)). Portfolio insurance is an extreme example of this, and stop-loss orders is
another example. Further, when banks face losses, depositors may withdraw capital
to limit their risk, other creditors may not roll over debt, counterparties shy away,
and this can lead to a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), Allen and Gale (2007), Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009)).
Figure 2 shows how market liquidity, funding liquidity, and volatility spiraled in the
liquidity crisis that started in 2007. Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) document
how these liquidity spirals played out in the convertible bond market in 1998 and
2005, and in the merger market in 1987. Similar – and, in fact, larger – liquidity
spirals have caused havoc in the convertible bond and fixed-income markets during the
recent crisis. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) discuss how the interplay between
market liquidity and funding liquidity can help explain commonality in liquidity across
securities and markets, flight to quality, that liquidity is poor in down markets, and
other empirical phenomena documented by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000),
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001), Coughenour and Saad
(2004), Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005), Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan
(2005), and Hendershott, Moulton, and Seasholes (2006). Adrian and Shin (2009)
provide evidence that broker-dealers have pro-cyclical leverage, consistent with the
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Figure 4: Liquidity Spirals. The chart shows how an initial shock to financial insti-
tutions’ funding is amplified by increasing margins (margin spirals), losses on existing
positions (loss spiral), and tightened risk management (risk management spiral).
margin spiral. Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) document that speculators
use the carry trade in currency markets, and their unwinding during funding crises
leads to currency crash risk. The crash risk discourages speculators from taking large
enough positions to enforce the uncovered interest-rate parity (UIP), and thus funding
liquidity risk can help explain the forward premium puzzle.
3.3 Implications for Asset Pricing
Given the costs incurred in liquidity crises, investors must manage their liquidity risk
and be compensated for taking on liquidity risk. Hence, securities with more liq-
uidity risk must offer a higher return to compensate investors for incurring the risk.
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) consider such a model in which transaction costs change
unpredictably over time.8 Since investors care about return net of costs, the CAPM
holds in net returns. A security’s required return depends, therefore, on its net-return
beta, that is, the covariance covt(r
i
t+1 − cit+1, rMt+1 − cMt+1) between the return ri net
of trading costs ci with the market return rM net of market trading costs cM . This
covariance can be separated into four terms, namely the standard market beta coming
from covt(r
i
t+1, r
M
t+1) as well as three liquidity risks: (i) +covt(c
i
t+1, c
M
t+1) is the compen-
8Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show how required returns depend on average market liquidity.
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sation for the commonality of liquidity as investors require higher returns for securities
with higher trading costs during liquidity crises when trading costs are high in general;
(ii) −covt(rit+1, cMt+1) with a negative sign, meaning that investors require higher return
for a security that has a low return during liquidity crises when cM is high; and (iii)
−covt(cit+1, rMt+1) implying compensation for high illiquidity in a down market.
This market-liquidity-adjusted CAPM implies that, when the market becomes illiq-
uid and liquidity risk goes up, the required return rises ( ∂
∂Cit
Et(r
i
t+1 − rf ) > 0) and,
therefore, contemporaneous returns are low (covt(c
i
t+1, r
i
t+1) < 0). For instance, due to
the liquidity risk that arose when the banking system faced trouble in 2008, the re-
quired return rose, which contributed to the downfall in prices. Amihud (2002), Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) find empirical evidence for
the pricing of liquidity risk.
Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) consider the asset pricing effects of funding liquid-
ity risk — as opposed to market liquidity risk discussed above — by showing how a
security’s margin requirement can increase its required return.9 The paper considers
a relatively minimal extension of the Lucas tree model, having two groups of agents
with different risk aversion facing margin requirements. The more risk tolerant agents
(which can be interpreted as the financial institutions) use leverage. Hence, after
negative fundamental shocks, they incur large losses and ultimately hit their margin
constraint.
The paper shows that a security’s required return is the sum of its beta times
the risk premium (as in the standard CAPM or consumption CAPM), and its margin
requirement times the cost of capital — a compensation for funding liquidity risk. The
paper finds large asset pricing effects by explicitly solving the model and calibrating
it using realistic parameters, and the model can help explain the deviations from the
Law of One Price during the recent and previous crises. For instance, corporate bonds
have traded at higher yield spreads than corresponding credit default swaps (CDS),
giving rise to an apparent arbitrage called the CDS-bond basis. This can be explained
by the fact that the margin requirement on the bond is higher than that of the CDS.
Hence, investors require a higher yield on a high-margin bond than on a low-margin
CDS when capital is scarce. Further, the basis varies in the time series with the
tightness of credit and in the cross section with the margin differential, consistent
with the model. Another stark failure of the Law of One Price is the failure of covered
interest-rate parity (CIP), which was driven by a dollar funding need by global financial
institutions combined with a limited ability to arbitrage the deviation due to binding
margin requirements.
The Fed and other central banks have tried to improve the financing environment
by providing lending programs that offer collateralized loans with lower margins than
9He and Krishnamurthy (2008) consider a model where intermediaries are constrained in raising
equity instead of debt.
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otherwise available. Since lower margins lead to lower required returns, this leads to
higher prices of debt securities, which ultimately results in improved credit conditions
for businesses and households. Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2009) use a survey
conducted by the Fed to see how market participants change their bids in response to
lower margins/haircuts. The evidence suggests that the effect of margins is very large.
Margins, and financing conditions more broadly, are important both for asset prices
and for financial firms’ ability to operate, and these affect the real economy through
consumers’ and firms’ access to credit and ability to issue securities. Hence, lend-
ing programs, broadening the acceptable collateral, and setting margins/haircuts are
important monetary policy tools during liquidity crises.
4 Conclusion
The recent liquidity crisis’ severe consequences for the global economy highlight the
importance of liquidity risk. Liquidity shocks are sudden, spill over across markets
where levered traders have positions, and affect mostly risky and illiquid securities
with large increases in margins. Liquidity events can happen even in the most liquid
markets in the world as clearly illustrated by the sharp drop and rebound in the values
of quant positions in U.S. large cap stocks during August 2007.
Investors need to manage both their funding liquidity, including their cash manage-
ment, the financing terms (margins/haircuts), and the risk of changes in financing or
equity redemptions, and their market liquidity risk, including the trading costs, possi-
ble hikes in trading costs, the time it takes to unwind positions in an orderly fashion,
and the risk of predatory trading (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005, 2009)).
Further, investors need to be compensated for taking liquidity risk. Their pricing
models should capture market liquidity risk (Acharya and Pedersen (2005)) and funding
liquidity risk (Garleanu and Pedersen (2009)).
While predicting liquidity crises in advance is very challenging, it is useful to under-
stand whether price drops that already occurred were due to liquidity or fundamentals.
This is because liquidity events present both risks and opportunities — liquidity in-
duced price drops tend to revert and investors with dry powder can try to capture this
rebound.
During a liquidity crisis, central banks can use unconventional monetary tools that
improve the financing environment, e.g. by offering collateralized loans at lower, but
still prudent, haircuts/margins, and, in good times, central banks need to reduce banks’
incentive to take on systemic risk (Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson
(2009), Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2009), Curdia and Woodford (2009), Gertler
and Karadi (2009), Reis (2009)).
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